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Communities . . . have a history-in an important sense they are constituted by their past-and for this reason we can speak of a real community as a "community of memory," one that does not forget its past. In order not to forget that past, a community is involved in retelling its story, its constitutive narrative, and in so doing, it offers examples of the men and women who have embodied and exemplified the meaning of the community. These stories of collective history and exemplary individuals are an important part of the tradition that is so central to a community of memory . . . But the stories are not all exemplary, not all about successes and achievements. A genuine community of memory will also tell painful stories of shared suffering that sometimes creates deeper identities than success. . . . And if the community is completely honest, it will remember stories not only of suffering received but of suffering inflicted-dangerous memories, for they call the community to alter ancient evils.
-Robert Bellah, Habits of the Heart Every nation-state faces the problem of representing its past in a credible and moving way. Many nations fail, and that failure constitutes a "Memory Problem". In the West, the Memory Problem consists of an erosion of national narratives, a loosening of the bond between present and past and a fragmenting of the historical continuum into "pure, unrelated presents in time" (Jameson 1984: 72; see also Terdiman 1993) . Extending Maurice Halbwachs's ([1950] 1980) observation that "history starts when tradition ends and the social memory is fading or breaking up" (p. 78), Pierre Nora (1996) asserts that "memory is constantly on our lips because it no longer exists." Just as history replaces tradition, commemorative symbolism, including monuments, shrines, relics, iconography and ritual, becomes "fleeting incursions of the sacred into a disenchanted world; vestiges of parochial loyalties in a society that is busily effacing all parochialisms" (p. 8). It is not new or revised historical narratives that are distinctive of the West, but an unprecedented sense that all such narratives are irrelevant. The above assertions summarize the state of memory in the West, but do they apply in the East? We use the terms "Western" and "Northeast Asian" as shorthand for two clusters of nations, each having a definite core and indefinite boundaries. Western countries are exemplified by central and western Europe, Great Britain and its three major settler societies: the United States, Canada and Australia. Northeast Asia is exemplified by three core nations: China, Japan and Korea. No absolute unity can be claimed for these nations, but the differences among them-differences in religion, philosophy, literature, visual arts, music, moral values and worldviews-are small compared to differences between them and the nations of the West. This East-West divide is not to be dismissed as a product of Eurocentric bias; it is palpable and consequential. Associated with the contrast between Asia and the West are unexplored issues in the field of collective memory.
The Northeast Asian Memory Problem involves a surfeit rather than a deficit of memory, and this excess is negative: unforgettable traumas prevent nations from coming to terms with the problems of the present. In the West, business among nations is typically conducted with little thought of historical animosities; in the countries of Northeast Asia, the past is present at every business negotiation table; debates over historical events complicate domestic politics and international relations. Intellectuals have already developed a concept, "The History Problem", to emphasize the significance of these debates, and they use that concept frequently and deliberately. Only indirectly, however, is the History Problem a historiographical matter; rather, it concerns the way Asians invoke the past and play the history card in their relations with one another. It concerns the way they conceive and symbolize historical events. The History Problem is, in fact, a Memory Problem that facts alone cannot resolve. At issue is not the objective detail of Japan's World War II atrocities but the spectacle of Japanese leaders commemorating those who perpetrated them and the exculpatory tone of much Japanese political and historical discourse. At issue is the implacable refusal of Chinese and Koreans to accept declarations of regret, to demand in every gesture of apology a level of incontestable "sincerity"-in short, proof of the unprovable.
International discourse on human rights and growing economic and political interdependence within Northeast Asia define the context of the Memory Problem. In addition, political benefits, including the securing of internal cohesion and legitimacy, abound. But why does memory perform these functions? Why is the problem of memory more acute in Asia than elsewhere? What factors about Asian history, culture and society make the past so relevant and its problems so enduring?
In recent years the problem of Asian memory has been amply studied, but not within a sociology of memory framework. Memory, History, and
